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Abstract:
This paper quantifies the welfare impact of unilateral trade liberalization and computes
the optimal tariff structure for Costa Rica in the presence of trade-policy-induced international
capital flows and foreign capital taxation. For this, an applied general equilibrium model
integrating trade, capital flows and international capital income taxation is used. The model has
been calibrated to a 1990-91 data set for the economies of Costa Rica and a group of OECD
countries. In the model, foreign capital income is taxed by host countries and the tax-credit
system operates in foreign investors home countries. Results for Costa Rica show that complete
trade liberalization ends up being welfare-reducing, as it leads to an outflow of capital and loss
of tax revenue which more than offset the efficiency gains from an enhanced resource allocation.
The optimal tariff structure for the Costa Rican economy turns out to be a mixture of import
tariffs and subsidies, though of a relatively small level.
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Non-Technical Summary
It is well-known that, in the absence of foreign capital taxation, international capital inflows
induced by the imposition of import tariffs are welfare-reducing for a small open
economy¾whose optimal trade policy continues to be one of free trade. Less well-known is the
fact that when a host, small open economy taxes foreign capital and taxes paid by foreign
companies are credited against their corresponding tax liability in their home country, tariff-
induced-capital inflows may be welfare-enhancing, and the optimal trade policy for the host
economy will not longer consist of free trade. In such a case, therefore, trade liberalization by a
small economy may indeed reduce its welfare.
This paper uses a calibrated general equilibrium model to quantify the welfare effect of trade
liberalization in the small open economy of Costa Rica once trade-policy-induced international
capital flows and foreign capital taxation are taken into consideration. It also computes Costa
Rica’s optimal tariff structure under this setting. The model used disaggregates economic activity
into 10 sectors, and is calibrated to a 1990-91 data set on production, trade, consumption, factor
use, and capital income taxation both for Costa Rica and a group of OECD countries. The OECD
countries included in this group are those which, as of 1990-91, were using the tax-credit
mechanism described above, and accounted for roughly 80% of Costa Rica’s foreign direct
investment.
Our results show that, with foreign capital taxation by Costa Rica and the tax credit mechanism
in force in the OECD countries included in the model, complete elimination of import-tariffs by
Costa Rica would reduce its welfare. The optimal tariff structure for this economy turns out to
consist of a combination of relatively low import tariffs and subsidies. Though literally
interpreted these results seem to provide a case against free trade, we qualify them by noting that
the nature of the model used does not capture neither dynamic gains associated with trade nor
other static cost usually linked with non-uniform tariff structures (such as rent-seeking-related
costs).
1 Introduction
This paper uses a calibrated general equilibrium model to quantify the welfare
e®ect of trade liberalization and compute the optimal tari® structure in a small econ-
omy (Costa Rica) when trade-policy-induced international capital °ows and foreign
capital taxation are present.
A well-known result from the \tari®-jumping" investment literature of the 1970s
is that import-tari®-induced capital in°ows will be immiserizing for a small open
economy (e.g. Brecher and Diaz-Alejandro, 1977). It is also known that this result
relies crucially on the assumption that the host economy does not tax foreign capital
(Bhagwati, 1973). As Bond (1991) has shown, if this assumption is lifted and taxes
paid in the host country by foreign companies are credited in the source country
against the corresponding domestic tax liability, tari®-induced capital in°ows are no
longer immiserizing. The reason for this is that in this case foreign capital brings with
it tax revenue that would otherwise go to the capital-exporting country. Therefore,
to capture this revenue and increase national income, it will be optimal for a small
economy to impose a tari® on its imports|provided that the importable sector uses
capital intensively
The possibility of import tari®s being welfare-enhancing for a small economy may
have some policy implications for many developing countries which have embarked
on outward-oriented growth strategies in the last ¯fteen years or so. First, unilateral
trade liberalization and foreign direct investment ¯gure prominently in most LDCs'
\new" growth strategies. Second, in many developing countries trade liberalization
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has implied a lower tari® protection for the manufacturing sector (relative to oth-
ers), which tends to be relatively capital-intensive. This, as the Stolper-Samuelson
theorem suggests, will tend to reduce the return to capital and thereby FDI in°ows
to these countries. Third, the bulk of FDI in developing countries originates in de-
veloped countries, the majority of which uses the tax credit mechanism when taxing
foreign source income.1 In this context, unilateral trade liberalization could deterio-
rate national welfare. Whether it does or not is an empirical question|which would
depend on the relative strength of the positive e®ect of lower distortions resulting
from freer trade, and the negative e®ect associated with the loss of tax revenue and
income following lower FDI in°ows.
Although a lot of work has been devoted to the theoretical link between import
tari®s and international capital °ows (see e.g. Wong, 1996), model-based empiri-
cal work endogenously linking capital °ows to tari® changes in a general equilibrium
setting|whether with foreign capital taxation or not| is quite scant. In fact, the only
calibrated study that appears to have addressed this linkage is Goulder and Eichen-
green (1992).2 However, they focused exclusively on portfolio investment, without
1As of 1991, 15 out of 24 OECD countries o®ered their companies credits for taxes paid in
countries with which a treaty to avoid double taxation was not in e®ect (see OECD, 1991).
2Some applied general equilibrium models seeking to quantify the e®ects of the North American
Free Agreement (NAFTA) explored the likely impact of incorporating FDI °ows, but did so in an
ad-hoc, exogenous fashion. See Brown (1992); Francois and Shiells (1994). Damus et al. (1991) have
studied the implications of the existence of tax credits for Canada but in a corporate tax reform
context.
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considering FDI. They do not consider international capital income taxation either.
In this paper we quantify the welfare impact of unilateral trade liberalization in
a small economy (Costa Rica) once FDI-°ow responses are taken into account and
taxation of FDI is allowed for. For this, a multisectoral applied general equilibrium
model integrating trade, capital °ows and international capital income taxation is
used. The model has been calibrated to a 1990-91 data for Costa Rica and a group
of OECD countries (those using the credit mechanism when taxing foreign source
income), and is also used to compute Costa Rica's optimal tari® structure. We show
that, with foreign capital taxation and the tax credit system in force, free trade is
no longer ¯rst-best for the Costa Rican economy. We ¯nd that the optimal tari®
structure for this economy would consist of a combination of relatively low import
tari®s and subsidies.
The paper is organized as follows. The next Section brie°y discusses the relation-
ship between import tari®s, capital °ows and welfare with and without tax credits.
Section 3 describes recent trade liberalization and FDI policy in Costa Rica. Section
4 presents our model, while Section 5 discusses the nature of the data used for its
implementation. Section 6 analyses simulation results, and Section 7 summarizes and
concludes.
2 Tari®s, Capital Flows and Welfare
The relationship between unilateral tari® changes and international capital move-
ments has been analyzed in great detail in the theoretical international trade liter-
ature (see, e.g. Mundell, 1957; Jones, 1967; Wong, 1995). The dominant approach
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considers trade and capital movements to be substitutes for each other.3 This ap-
proach is based on the traditional Heckscher-Ohlin model, in which countries di®er in
terms of relative factor endowments. As is well known, in this model free trade leads
to the equalization of factor prices, which eliminates the rationale for factor move-
ments. Hence free trade is a perfect substitute for factor movements. On the other
hand, if factors move from where they are abundant to where they are scarce, the
bases for trade are reduced, or disappear. Hence factor movements are a substitute
for trade (Ru±n, 1984).
The interaction between tari® changes and capital movements was ¯rst formally
presented by Mundell (1957). In a two-sector, two-factor model, invoking the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem, Mundell shows that when a tari® is imposed by the labor-
abundant country the return to capital is increased, and capital moves there; with
perfect capital mobility, trade eventually disappears. This type of analysis later gave
rise to the literature on \tari®-jumping" investment and its welfare consequences for
a small open economy. The main conclusion of this literature was that the combi-
nation of capital in°ows and distortionary tari® barriers in a small economy would
result in immiserizing growth. The idea had been suggested in Johnson (1967) and
Bhagwati (1973), and it was further developed by Minabe (1974), and Brecher and
Diaz-Alejandro (1977) in a two-good, two-factor framework. It was generalized by
Jones (1984), and especially by Neary and Ruane (1988). The second two authors
3Schmitz and Helmberger (1970), Markusen (1983), and Wong (1986) have presented models in
which trade and capital °ows are complements.
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lifted the restriction on the number of goods and factors, and extended the main
result to the case in which capital in°ows are entirely endogenous.
In all these models, however, the result of distortionary tari® changes leading to
immiserizing capital in°ows relies crucially on foreign capital not being taxed by the
host country. Bond (1991) presents a general equilibrium model with foreign capital
taxation and two goods|one of which is imported|for small economy (\small" both
in goods and capital markets). With the importable good being capital-intensive,
Bond shows that if the credit mechanism is present in foreign investors' home country,
the optimal import tari® for a small, host economy is positive. With the credit
mechanisms present in the capital-exporting country, by taxing foreign capital income,
the host country extract a gain in terms of tax revenue that would otherwise be
captured by the home country, thus increasing national income and welfare. As Bond
indicates, by bringing with it tax revenue, foreign capital generates a kind of (positive)
¯scal externality in the host country. Therefore, a subsidy on foreign capital is called
for, and this can be granted in the form of an import tari®.
The argument, as presented by Bond, runs as follows. For the host to capture all
of the tax revenue associated with foreign capital income, its tax rate must be set at
a level equal to that in the capital-exporting country. This, however, gives rise to a
divergence between private and social cost of capital, i.e. the gross and the net rate
of return, respectively. The latter is indeed the return required by foreign capitalists,
which in equilibrium must be the same in the host and home country. Therefore, the
optimal policy for the host consists of subsidizing foreign capital at a rate equal to
the income tax rate. As Bond (p. 321) puts it, \essentially, the home country wants
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to pay the taxes for the owners of imported capital and to impose no distortions in
the goods market."
In practice, however, it might not be feasible for a country to subsidize foreign
capital in such a direct way. On the other hand, as pointed out by Bond, some capital-
exporting countries (such as the USA) do not grant credits for taxes that have actually
not been paid. Under these circumstances, it might be easier and more e®ective
for a capital-importing country to resort to an indirect form of subsidization, such
as an import tari®|provided, of course, that foreign capital locates in the import-
competing sector. As the tari® will distort consumption decisions, it will be an inferior
option to the direct subsidy|but still superior to free trade. In Section 6 we compare
the performance of the direct subsidy vis-µa-vis that of the optimal tari®.
3 Recent Trade and Foreign Investment Policy in Costa Rica
Like the rest of Central American countries, ever since the creation of the Central
American Common Market (CACM) in 1960, Costa Rica followed a growth strategy
based on industrialization through import substitution, especially of consumer goods.
In trade policy terms, this strategy demanded the imposition of high tari® rates for
consumer goods, on the one hand, and of low import taxes for intermediates and
capital goods, on the other. Tari® protection for import substitutes during this period
was thus characterized by a somewhat high average level and dispersion (First column
of Table 1).
In the mid-1980s, in the context of broader policy reforms, the strategy of import
substitution was partially abandoned, as the country embarked on more open trade
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Table 1: Nominal Import-Tari® Protection in Costa Rica
(%)
1987 1994
Primary sector 4.8 6.2
Food. bev. and tob. 59.1 15.1
Textiles and apparel 41.1 19.9
Paper and printing 27.3 4.9
Chemical products 12.2 5.7
Non-met. mineral prod. 23.8 9.3
Metal products 14.2 8.6
Other manufacturing 21.7 9.3
Source: Calculations based on SIECA (1993) and WTO (1995).
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policies, intending to foster growth mainly through export expansion. Since then,
but specially since 1990|the year that Costa Rica acceded to GATT|all import
quantitative restrictions and regulations|except those having to do with security,
health and environmental considerations|have been eliminated, while tari® rates
have been substantially reduced, especially for consumer goods of industrial origin
(Table 1). As a result, both the level of protection and its dispersion have been
substantially lowered.
Simultaneously to this unilateral trade liberalization, Costa Rica has also em-
barked on some reciprocal, regional trade liberalization. In e®ect, Costa Rica signed
a free trade agreement with Mexico in 1994, which went into e®ect at the begin-
ning of 1995. It has also been engaged in negotiations to establish a free trade area
with Colombia and Venezuela, though no formal agreement has been reached. There
has also been some further liberalization within the CACM, especially of agricultural
goods.
Costa Rica's trade reforms have been accompanied by changes in its foreign invest-
ment regime, seeking to make the country more attractive to foreign companies. The
idea has been to foster growth not only by reducing distortions but also by increasing
capital accumulation. Foreign investment is also supposed to be a response to the
need of reducing unemployment and increasing productivity levels; the latter to the
extent that FDI can produce some technology transfer bene¯ting eventually domestic
¯rms as well. Costa Rica's reforms of its FDI regime, however, have not been as
far-reaching as those in the area of trade policy. They have consisted mainly of the
abolishment of restrictions on international capital movements, and the partial lifting
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of foreign ownership restrictions in some economic activities. However, important
foreign ownership restrictions still continue in place in activities such as banking and
insurance, telecommunications, and energy (Nathan and Associates, 1994). Foreign
investment in newspapers and advertising agencies is prohibited, while regulations in
the transport and tourism sectors discriminate against foreign investors and set limits
to their participation.
Recent Costa Rican e®orts to attract FDI have focused on the subscription of
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) with some developed countries. Among other
things, these BITs provide national treatment to foreign investors, as well as the op-
tion of international arbitration in dispute settlement. They are also consistent with
the World Trade Organization's provisions on Trade-Related Investment Measures
(TRIMs), which ban the use of performance requirements. As of 1994, Costa Rica
had established BITs with Switzerland and Germany, and was in the process of ne-
gotiating similar agreements with the United States and Spain. Regional free trade
agreements|such as the one subscribed with Mexico in 1994|are also intended to
make the country more attractive to foreign investors as they enlarge the size of the
market in which Costa Rican goods can be sold duty-free.
Unlike many developing countries' foreign investment regime (see, e.g., UNCTAD,
1993), the Costa Rican FDI regime does not contain incentives available only to
foreign investors. Some export promotion schemes bene¯t to a large extent foreign
companies but they are also available to domestic ¯rms. This is the case of duty-free
trade zones and other very similar schemes presently being implemented in Costa
Rica. They o®er ¯rms not only tari® exemptions for goods used in production but
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also generous tax holidays. Tax incentives for ¯rms operating in duty-free trade
zones in Costa Rica consist of full income tax exemption for 10-12 years, and 50
percent exemption for the following 4-6 years (WTO, 1995).4 They also provide full
exemption on taxes on capital and assets for an inde¯nite period of time. Though
the main objective of these schemes is export promotion, ¯rms operating in duty-free
zones are allowed to sell up to 40 percent of their output in the domestic market
(WTO, 1995).
The next Section describes the model used to simulate the e®ects of unilateral
trade liberalization on welfare in Costa Rica, once FDI responses and international
capital income taxation are taken into consideration.
4 The Model
Production
There are two countries,5 A and B, each producing n goods (n>1), some of which
(at least) are tradeables. Production in each country requires a ¯xed-proportion
combination of value added and intermediate inputs (henceforth superscripts denote
4The fact that many developed countries use the credit mechanism when taxing foreign source
income often makes these income tax incentives largely ine®ective when their bene¯ciaries are foreign
companies.
5In the empirical implementation of the model we consider in fact three \countries," including a
\Rest of the World." To keep notation as simple as possible and avoid repetition, throughout this
section we abstract from this third region.
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countries, and they refer to A and B unless otherwise indicated; for convenience,
subscripts to index sectors are omitted):
X i = min(Qi; Zi); (1)
where X i is gross output, Qi is value added and Zi represents intermediate inputs.
Intermediate inputs, in turn, are also required in a ¯xed proportion:
Zi = ÁiX i; (2)
where Ái denotes the ¯xed amount of intermediate goods required to produce a unit
of output.
Value added requires the use of two primary inputs, labor and capital, L and K,
whose supply is assumed to be ¯xed. These primary inputs are combined according
to a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function:
Qi(Li; Ki) ´ °i[®i(Li)¾i + (1¡ ®i)(Ki)¾i] 1¾i ; (3)
where Qi denote value added, °i is a shift parameter, ®i a share parameters and
¾i re°ects the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital in each country
(elasticity, ²i1 = 1=(1¡ ¾i)).
Furthermore, it is assumed that labor is internationally immobile while capital
can move freely across countries. Capital used in production in each country is an
aggregate of domestic capital (Kid) and foreign capital (K
i
m), which are viewed as im-
perfect substitutes.6 This speci¯cation allows for the consideration of the phenomenon
6This capital speci¯cation has also been used in some models of taxation in open economies (e.g.
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of cross-hauling in international capital °ows, re°ected by balance of payments data.
The corresponding aggregate capital function is given by
Ki(Kid;K
i
m) ´ [±i(Kid)½
i
+ (1¡ ±i)(K im)½
i
]
1
½i ; (4)
where ±i are share parameters and ½i re°ects the elasticity of substitution between
domestic and foreign capital in each country (elasticity, ²i2 = 1=(1¡ ½i)).
We assume that both countries tax their capital on a world-wide basis and give
a tax credit for taxes paid abroad. The maximum amount of tax credit is the corre-
sponding home country tax liability. Countries are assumed to apply the same tax
rate to foreign source and domestically generated income. We denote these rates by
¿A and ¿B and assume that ¿A > ¿B. Taxation in each country does not discriminate
between income from foreign capital and income from domestic capital generated in-
ternally. In each country, the rate of return is in principle di®erent for domestic and
foreign capital.
The equilibrium conditions for factor demand are as follows:
For labor,
!i =
@Qi
@Li
; (5)
where !i represent the wage rate.
For foreign capital and domestic capital, respectively,
Àim = (1¡ ¿A)
@Qi
@Ki
@Ki
@Kim
; (6)
Wang and Pereira, 1994). In a dynamic setting, Bovenberg (1986) also uses an speci¯cation like this
for investment goods.
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Àid = (1¡ ¿A)
@Qi
@Ki
@Ki
@Kid
; (7)
where Àim and À
i
d represent the net return on foreign and domestic capital in each
country.
Equilibrium in the international allocation of capital requires that capital of a
given nationality earns the same net return regardless of where is used (domestically
or abroad). That is,
ÀAd = À
B
m (8)
ÀBd = À
A
m (9)
We also assume that there is perfect competition both in goods and factor markets.
In the latter, the assumption of full employment is also made.
Consumption and Trade
Imported and domestic goods, M i and Di, respectively, are assumed to be imperfect
substitutes for each other. Traded goods consumed in each country are a composite,
Y i, of M i and Di. The corresponding CES aggregation function is given by
Y i ´ [Ãi(M i)¡´i + (1¡ Ãi)(Di)¡´i]¡ 1´i ; (10)
where Ãi is a share parameter and ´i re°ects the elasticities of substitution between
domestic and imported goods (elasticity, ²i3 = (1¡ ´i)=´i).
Similarly, for exports we use a Constant Elasticity of Transformation (CET) func-
tion. Thus, the technology that transforms output for the domestic market into
output for the export market is described by
X i ´ [¯i(Di)µi + (1¡ ¯i)(Ei)µi] 1µi ; (11)
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where Di and Ei are output produced for the domestic and export market, respec-
tively, ¯i is a distribution parameter and µi re°ects the elasticity of transformation
(elasticity, ²i4 = (1 + µ
i)=µi).
Countries levy tari®s on their imports at rates ti. Thus, the domestic price of
imports inclusive of tari®s is
P im = P
w
m(1 + t
i); (12)
where Pwm is the world price of imports.
Income
It is assumed that revenue from income and trade taxes is returned to consumers
in a lump-sum fashion. Thus, assuming also that pro¯ts from foreign capital are
fully repatriated to the home country once the corresponding domestic income taxes
have been paid, augmented income for country A is given by (that for B follows by
symmetry)
IA = !ALA + rAdK
A
d + (1¡ ¿A)rBmKBm + ¿ArAmKAm + tAPwmMA; (13)
where the rAd and r
i
m are the gross rate of return on domestic and foreign capital,
respectively.
Market Clearing Conditions
Equilibrium in the goods market requires
Y i = Di +M i; (14)
14
In the factor market, the clearing conditions are
Li = Lis; (15)
KA = KAd +K
B
m; (16)
KB = KBd +K
A
m: (17)
where Lis is the exogenous labor supply in each country.
5 Data and Parameter Calibration
The model described above has been calibrated to a 1990-91 data set on production,
trade and foreign direct investment for the economies of Costa Rica and a group of
OECD countries. The latter is made up of those countries which, as of 1991, o®ered
credits for taxes paid by their foreign investors in countries with which they did not
have an agreement to avoid international double taxation of capital income.7 This
suits also the case of Costa Rica, who, as of 1994, had not signed a treaty like that
with any of the OECD countries included in our group, except Germany (who, in
any case, uses the crediting mechanism with treaty-countries also). These group of
countries is responsible for more than 80 percent of FDI in Costa Rica. As mentioned
earlier, the empirical implementation of the model also includes a \Rest of the World."
OECD countries which do not use the credit mechanism are included in the Rest of
the World, together with developing countries.
7These countries are: Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom and the USA.
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The model contains 10 sectors and one household. We have aggregated the pri-
mary sector into one basically because of the lack of data on capital °ows. In desag-
gregating the manufacturing sector|whenever data constraints have allowed us|,
we have tried to separate those activities which have achieved a relatively high degree
of development by Costa Rican standards. The model includes separately a non-
tradeable sector (some non-traded services and construction) which, in Costa Rica
(in 1991), has no international capital °ows.
The production and trade-°ows data for the Costa Rican economy comes from the
Central Bank and the Ministry of Economy of Costa Rica. Sectoral foreign capital
stocks in manufacturing have been obtained on the basis of foreign capital shares in
overall capital income in each sector. Foreign capital stocks for agriculture and ser-
vices were obtained from UNCTAD's World Investment Directory 1994. These were
combined with estimates of aggregate capital stocks in those sectors to obtain sec-
toral domestic capital stocks. As no information on taxes paid by foreign companies
is available, we assume that no income tax exemptions are given to them,8 and that
they pay the legal 20 percent rate on their pro¯ts.
Table 2 presents the basic data used for the economy of Costa Rica. This is
a semi-industrialized economy with a relatively large service sector. Manufacturing
activities|especially light industry|have traditionally enjoyed a high tari® protec-
tion vis-µa-vis agriculture, and have tended to rely more heavily on imports, particu-
8This is consistent with Costa Rica's FDI regime, though not with its free-duty zone legislation
(see Section 3).
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larly of intermediate and capital goods.
The share of capital in value added in the Costa Rican economy has traditionally
been high, especially in manufacturing, where it exceeds 60 per cent. Capital, how-
ever, is overwhelmingly owned by nationals in all sectors of the economy. Compared
to some larger Latin American countries, for instance, foreign capital has not played a
particularly important role in the economy of Costa Rica.9 FDI has tended to concen-
trate more in manufacturing. The United States is by far the single most important
foreign investor in the country, with American companies controlling about a quarter
of FDI in the manufacturing sector and virtually all foreign capital in agriculture
(UNCTAD, 1994, vol. 4).
Production data, including input-output °ows, for the group of OECD countries
comes from OECD (1995), and is based on data for Canada, Germany, Japan, the
United Kingdom and the USA. Trade °ows net of intra-regional trade have been
computed from information from OECD's Statistics of Foreign Trade by Commodity
1992 for the same countries. Sectoral foreign capital stocks are based on the share
of foreign assets in aggregate assets in each sector for the same group of countries,
excluding Canada (for which this information was not available). The data is based
on information from UNCTAD (1994). Tari® rates refer to MNF tari®s corrected
9Indicators on the importance of foreign capital in Latin American countries are usually scant
but those existing are quite revealing: In Brazil, in 1990, more than 40 percent of overall pro¯ts
in the economy were generated by foreign a±liates; while in Mexico, in 1986|when the Mexican
foreign investment regime was still very restrictive|more than half of all assets were controlled by
foreign a±liates (UNCTAD, 1994, Vol. 4, Table 9).
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Table 2: Costa Rica: Some Central Case Parameters
QSH M=Y E=X KI=Q KIm=KI Tariffs
¤
Primary sector 0.180 0.126 0.424 0.573 0.167 0.0004
Food. bev. and tob. 0.100 0.067 0.295 0.678 0.062 0.087
Textiles and apparel 0.017 0.495 0.468 0.547 0.096 0.139
Paper and printing 0.016 0.392 0.096 0.647 0.153 0.041
Chemical products 0.019 0.606 0.222 0.645 0.095 0.040
Non-met. mineral prod. 0.010 0.288 0.156 0.658 0.337 0.147
Metal products 0.005 0.836 0.472 0.712 0.422 0.053
Other manufacturing 0.034 0.582 0.275 0.686 0.111 0.069
Tradeable services 0.376 0.085 0.192 0.520 0.027 n.a.
Non-tradeables 0.244 0.000 0.000 0.275 0.000 n.a.
Overall 1.000 0.214 0.219 0.498 0.073 0.052
Column headings:
QSH: Value added share
M=Y : Share of imports in supply
E=X: Share of exports in output
KI=Q: Share of capital income in value added
KIm=KI: Share of foreign capital income in aggregate capital income
¤ Ratio of tari® revenue to imports. This column is quite di®erent from those in Table
1 both because it corresponds to a di®erent year (1991) and because takes into account
exemptions and the existence of free trade within the CACM.
n.a. = not applicable
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by the coverage of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program in each
sector.10 For completeness, Table 3 presents some base data for the group of OECD
countries.
Regarding elasticities, the trade elasticity values we use are based on those that
have recently been used in the literature (see, e.g. Hinojosa-Ojeda and Robinson,
1991; Perroni and Wigle, 1994). We use a lower elasticity value for primary goods as
these tend to be more homogeneous across countries than, for instance, manufacturing
goods. To take account of country size, smaller elasticities are used for Costa Rica.
The values we use are: 1.25 for primary goods and 1.75 for other goods, for Costa
Rica; and 2.0 and 2.5, respectively, for the group of OECD countries. As to input-
substitution in value added, we use a Cobb-Douglas speci¯cation. The elasticity
of substitution between domestic and foreign capital, in turn, has been assumed
to be 1.25 and 2.0 in Costa Rica and the group of OECD countries, respectively,
in all sectors. We carry out sensitivity analysis on the values of trade and capital
substitution elasticities. Finally, shift and share parameters are obtained through
calibration.
6 Simulation Results
We have used the model and data described above to quantify the welfare gains, or
losses, to the economy of Costa Rica from completely eliminating import tari®s. We
also compute the optimal tari® structure for this economy in the presence of taxation
10We have used the proportion of items within each sector covered by the GSP program in the
United States.
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Table 3: OECD countries: Some Central Case Parameters
QSH M=Y E=X KI=Q KIm=KI Tariffs
Primary sector 0.034 0.119 0.015 0.683 0.005 0.035
Food. bev. and tob. 0.025 0.037 0.020 0.357 0.034 0.041
Textiles and apparel 0.011 0.171 0.025 0.226 0.020 0.086
Paper and printing 0.021 0.020 0.020 0.265 0.005 0.017
Chemical products 0.023 0.020 0.064 0.300 0.025 0.032
Non-met. mineral prod. 0.001 0.027 0.024 0.323 0.065 0.043
Metal products 0.023 0.026 0.036 0.295 0.005 0.028
Other manufacturing 0.112 0.046 0.077 0.206 0.005 0.031
Tradeable services 0.265 0.009 0.017 0.379 0.009 n.a.
Non-tradeables 0.479 0.000 0.000 0.445 0.000 n.a.
Overall 1.000 0.023 0.023 0.393 0.073 n.a.
Column headings:
QSH: Value added share
M=Y : Share of imports in supply
E=X: Share of exports in output
KI=Q: Share of capital income in value added
KIm=KI: Share of foreign capital income in aggregate capital income
n.a. = not applicable
20
of foreign capital income. Our result discussion focuses on Costa Rica since we are
concerned with the case of a small economy. Central case results for this country are
presented in Table 4.
Table 4 presents the welfare and capital °ow e®ects of trade liberalization as well
as the optimal import-tari® structure. With no taxation of foreign capital income,
the optimal commercial policy consists e®ectively of free trade. Trade liberalization
causes an out°ow of capital of 0.66 percent, which, in the absence of foreign capital
taxation, does not hurt the economy and is in fact accompanied by a slight wel-
fare improvement (the small size of this improvement is the result of relatively low
tari®s|which, furthermore, generally do not exhibit a great deal of dispersion, as
shown in Table 2). The intuition for capital leaving the country is provided by the
Stolper-Samuelson theorem. Since in Costa Rica import-tari® protection is higher for
manufacturing activities (Table 2), its elimination tends generally to contract these
activities. Given that in this economy manufacturing activities tend to be intensive
users of capital relative to others, its contraction reduces the demand for capital,
making this factor's return fall.
With foreign capital being taxed, the out°ow of capital produced by complete
tari® elimination causes welfare to fall by about 0.05 per cent. This results from
lower income tax revenue and national income. The small size of the welfare decline
suggests that the optimal tari® structure is not very di®erent from free trade|and in
fact this turns out to be the case (Table 4). Under the optimal tari® structure with
foreign capital taxation, agricultural imports would be subsidized whereas those of
manufacturing goods would be generally subject to a tari®. Optimal tari®s tend to
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Table 4: Trade Liberalization E®ects and Optimal Tari® Structure:
Central Case
I. Liberalization E®ects (%)
Change
1. Welfare (change in utility)
A. With no foreign capital taxation 0.21
B. With foreign capital taxation -0.05
2. Capital Stock (change in aggregate level) -0.49
II. Optimal Tari® Structure (%)
Tari® Rate
Primary sector -4.21
Food. bev. and tob. 0.12
Textiles and apparel -0.21
Paper and printing -0.02
Chemical products 1.15
Non-met. mineral prod. 2.56
Metal products 3.21
Other manufacturing 4.02
Tradeable services n.a.
Non-tradeables n.a.
n.a. = not applicable
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be higher in those sectors using capital more intensively, and which have a larger FDI
share (metal products and other manufacturing, especially).
The low level of the optimal subsidy and tari® is basically driven by the relatively
modest role played by foreign capital in the Costa Rican economy (Table 2). Of some
signi¯cance is also the fact that trade intervention distorts consumption patterns as
well. Substitution elasticities also play a role, though this is not very important in
absolute terms (Tables 5 and 6). Furthermore, the pattern of results across sectors
remains basically unchanged as elasticity values are varied. Higher trade elasticities
imply that trade liberalization has a stronger impact on goods relative prices and
thereby on relative factor returns. This leads to free trade causing a larger out°ow of
capital, which, in turn, generates higher welfare losses when foreign capital is taxed
(Table 5). The dispersion of incentives associated with the optimal tari®s is now
slightly greater. With a higher degree of substitution between foreign and domestic
capital (the corresponding elasticities are now equal to 2.0 for Costa Rica), the capital-
out°ow e®ect of trade liberalization is also strengthened (Table 6). Accordingly, the
negative welfare impact under foreign capital taxation is magni¯ed. The level of both
the optimal tari® and subsidy increases.
We have also computed the welfare gains for Costa Rica from directly subsidizing
capital (the ¯rst-best policy) instead of using import tari®s/subsidies. Results (for
the central case speci¯cation) show that this would increase welfare by only 0.02
percent in comparison with the optimal tari® scenario. This modest gain is not
surprising given that the optimal-tari® level across sectors is quite small and does
not present a great deal of dispersion (Table 4). Increasing the tax on foreign capital
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Table 5: Trade Liberalization E®ects and Optimal Tari® Structure:
Sensitivity Analyses on Trade Elasticities¤
I. Liberalization E®ects (%)
Change
1. Welfare (change in utility)
A. With no foreign capital taxation 0.25
B. With foreign capital taxation -0.08
2. Capital Stock (change in aggregate level) -0.68
II. Optimal Tari® Structure (%)
Tari® Rate
Primary sector -2.01
Food. bev. and tob. 0.14
Textiles and apparel -0.24
Paper and printing -0.03
Chemical products 1.37
Non-met. mineral prod. 2.81
Metal products 3.84
Other manufacturing 4.56
tradeable services n.a.
Non-tradeables n.a.
¤ trade elasticities are now 2.0 in agriculture and and 2.5 in other sectors.
n.a. = not applicable
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Table 6: Trade Liberalization E®ects and Optimal Tari® Structure:
Sensitivity Analyses on Capital Elasticities¤
I. Liberalization E®ects (%)
Change
1. Welfare (change in utility)
A. With no foreign capital taxation 0.23
B. With foreign capital taxation -0.07
2. Capital Stock (change in aggregate level) -0.66
II. Optimal Tari® Structure (%)
Tari® Rate
Primary sector -5.01
Food. bev. and tob. 0.18
Textiles and apparel -0.30
Paper and printing -0.03
Chemical products 1.75
Non-met. mineral prod. 3.82
Metal products 3.97
Other manufacturing 6.24
tradeable services n.a.
Non-tradeables n.a.
¤ capital substitution elasticities are now 2.0 in all sectors
n.a. = not applicable
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income to a level similar to the OECD average (approximately 38 percent in 1991
for countries using the credit mechanism) would generate greater welfare gains (three
times as much) than a switch to a direct subsidy. In a more desaggregated model,
this number should be smaller, as our calculation does not take into consideration
the fact that companies from countries with a tax rate lower than the OECD average
will ¯nd themselves with non-refundable excess credits and might therefore prefer to
locate in a di®erent country. Despite this, a greater tax rate on foreign capital income
might still be a superior option to the direct subsidy and seems to be more feasible
as well.
7 Summary and Conclusion
This paper has used a calibrated general equilibrium model to quantify the welfare
impact of trade liberalization and compute the optimal tari® structure for Costa Rica
in the presence of trade-policy-induced capital °ows and foreign capital taxation. We
¯nd that with foreign capital being taxed and the tax credit system in force, the
complete elimination of import tari®s hurts Costa Rica. This to the extent that
tari® removal leads to an out°ow of capital and a loss of tax revenue that more than
o®set the positive traditional reallocation e®ect of moving to free trade. Thus, the
optimal tari® structure for the Costa Rican economy does not consist of zero-import
tari®s, but rather of a mixture of positive import tari®s and subsidies. The optimal
tari® and subsidy levels are, however, quite low, re°ecting basically the fact that the
role of foreign capital in this economy is relatively modest. It would be interesting
to examine how results change in an economy in which foreign investment plays a
substantially more signi¯cant role.
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Given the relatively small level of optimal tari®s/subsidies, and the fact that
there seems to exist some costs associated with non-uniform-tari® structures (such
as rent-seeking-related costs, for instance), our ¯nding cannot be taken as providing
a strong case against free trade in an economy such as the Costa Rican. Also, it
must be bear in mind that the (static) nature of our model is unable to capture
dynamic gains often associated with trade (Stokey, 1991; Young, 1991). At the same
time, it should be noted that even if we restrict our analysis to the static cost and
bene¯ts of freer trade, trade liberalization typically does not consist of a complete
tari® elimination, but rather of a reduction in the level of protection and its dispersion.
Therefore, even in the presence of foreign capital taxation, trade liberalization, as
usually practiced, could still yield static welfare gains for a small open economy.
Our numerical simulations imply, however, that allowing for capital °ows and their
taxation might reduce the size of static gains from non-full trade liberalization.
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